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Abstract
In this paper, we use CSP to model two agents running the Needham-Schroeder
Public-Key Protocol. In addition, we model a very general intruder to interact
with the agents, and show that the protocol is awed using FDR.
We adapt the model to reect the x to the protocol suggested by Gavin
Lowe, and show that the protocol is secure.
We then discuss an attack on RSA with low-exponent public keys, and endow
the intruder with the power to use this attack. Finally, we model a typical
communications session to follow the use of the protocol, and analyse this new
system. We discover that, although the protocol itself is secure, a careless use
of public-key cryptography after the end of the protocol run allows the intruder
to learn enough sensitive information to be able to impersonate an agent in
sending messages.
Thanks are due to Bill Roscoe for all the help and advice given during the
thinking and writing stages.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Communication problems
All around us, wherever we turn, information is being transmitted from one
place to another. Whenever we turn on the television, pick up the telephone,
post a letter or read the newspaper, we assume a ro^le in the highly complex
network of communications we have developed across the globe.
The transmission of information from A to B is fraught with diculties.
There is the story of an army general who needed more troops than he had at
his disposal in order to eect his battle plan, and so sent the following message
back to allied headquarters:
\Going to advance|send reinforcements."
The message, however, had a long way to travel, and was passed on from
person to person by word of mouth. By the time it reached its destination, the
message read:
\Going to a dance|send three-and-fourpence."
The problem is clear enough: the medium of communication used is not suf-
ciently reliable to ensure that the message will arrive unaltered. Even though
no-one along the way deliberately changed the instruction, the whole point of
the message had been lost by the time it reached headquarters.
Of course, the problems become much greater once we consider that there
may be a malicious intruder attempting to intercept or alter the message. The
general will have cause to worry if there is any chance that the enemy will be
able to pick up the message en route to its destination|he does not want the
other side to know about his reinforcements until they march into battle. He
wants to make certain, if at all possible, that only those whom he wishes to hear
the message will in fact do so. He wants to ensure the secrecy of the message.
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The general's second-in-command at headquarters will also be concerned: he
wants to obey the general's instructions and send extra troops; but can he be
sure that the message really originated with the general? Might it not be a fake
message, invented by the enemy, with the intention of diverting his troops away
from another area? He wants to make certain, if at all possible, that the claimed
author of the message did in fact write it. He wants to ensure the authenticity
of the message.
Consider just how much power an enemy spy might have in such a situation!
If the messages are being transmitted via the spy, then he might engage in any
of the following courses of action, all potentially fatal as far as the general and
his allies are concerned:
 he may overhear messages and so learn secret information (which he can
then report to his superiors in the enemy camp)
 he may block messages by failing to pass them on to headquarters
 he may fake messages by passing on his own messages as if they were from
the general
1.2 Application to telecommunications
This project focuses on the problem of a malicious intruder as detailed above. It
does not deal with the diculties of an unreliable communication medium. We
assume that, if no intruder is present, then the system works as intended; and
that any problems we do encounter are caused intentionally by the intruder. We
will also assume that a computer will be used to send and to receive the data
(as it would be in the case of email, for example). When encryption comes into
play, the computer will be required to perform the encryption and decryption.
Here, then, is the basic set-up of the system which we will model. Albumen
(A) and Bastien (B), two honest agents, wish to be able to talk to each other
using their computers. They want to be able to type in messages, and send
them to each other. However, they are aware that the network is insecure. An
intruder is at large|let's call him Innocence (I)|and any data sent from A to
B goes via a point to which I has access. There is no way in this network of
determining the origin of any message which arrives; and no way of discovering
whether any message sent has in fact arrived. So I can, as before, overhear
messages as they pass through; he can block them; and he can fake them. How
are Albumen and Bastien to communicate securely? Each wants to be sure that
any message sent will not be understood by Innocence; and each wants to be
certain of the origin of any message received.
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1.3 Encryption
1.3.1 Private-key encryption
Suppose, for a moment, that Albumen and Bastien have agreed on a password
which they can use for communications, and that they are certain that Inno-
cence does not know the password. Then they can communicate securely by
means of private-key (or symmetric-key) encryption. They use a (previously
agreed) encryption function, such as the Data Encryption Standard (or DES|
for an introduction to which see [3]); this function f takes as its arguments
a key (password) K , and plaintext (unencrypted message) M , and returns a
corresponding ciphertext (encrypted message). The ciphertext will look unin-
telligible; but reapplying the function using the same password will yield the
original message. In other words,
f (K ; f (K ;M )) = M
In this way, both secrecy and authentication are assured. A knows, when she
encrypts, that since only she and B know the password, only he will be able to
decrypt and understand the message. In addition, when B receives the message,
he can be sure that, since only he and A knew the password, only A could have
produced the encrypted message. They can communicate freely without worry1.
Of course, the aw in the plan is that Albumen and Bastien need to agree on
a password. How are they to do so? If they have a reliable way of communicating
passwords to each other, why do they need the password at all? Why not simply
communicate their secret messages using their secure method? It rather seems
as if private-key encryption will not solve our problem.
1.3.2 Public-key encryption
In a public-key encryption system, two keys|say E and D|are used. We use
E to encrypt the message, but D to decrypt it at the receiver's end. Thus, if
our encryption function is g , we have that
g(D ; g(E ;M )) = M
In fact, E and D are inverses; so we also have that
g(E ; g(D ;M )) = M
Furthermore, if the keys are large enough, then (for any reasonable encryption
function) it will be infeasible to determine one key from the other.
(The most common public-key cryptosystem in use today is RSA, invented
by in 1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman. As with many
1In fact, this is too simplistic to be completely awless. With symmetric-key encryption, a
replay attack is sometimes possible, in which an intruder copies a message back to its source,
perhaps some time after its generation. The user will be given no indication that this is a
replay of his old message, rather than a new message from his friend.
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public-key cryptosystems, RSA also has the property of commutativity, which
is to say that
g(K1; g(K2;M )) = g(K2; g(K1;M ))
We will make use of the properties of RSA in section 3.1 on page 32; for a full
introduction to the subject, we advise the reader to consult [5, 4].)
This goes a long way towards solving our problem. Albumen can generate
her own pair of keys fEa ;Dag, and Bastien will similarly generate fEb ;Dbg.
The keys for encryption, namely Ea and Eb , can then be made publicly known;
these are referred to as the public keys2. But the keys for decryption, Da and
Db , should never be revealed to anyone; they are known as the secret keys.
Now if Bastien wants to send a message to Albumen, he encrypts it using
her public key. Anyone can generate such a message, since her public key is
known to everyone; but the secret key is required to decrypt the message, which
only Albumen holds. Bastien can thus be assured of secrecy.
Authentication is not so simply guaranteed, however, since everyone has the
necessary information to encrypt messages for Albumen. But remember that
we can also reverse the ro^les of the two keys, using the secret key to encrypt
and the public key to decrypt. If Bastien wishes to \sign" a message M , he can
send g(Db ;M ). Anyone can decrypt and read this message, since the key for
decryption is Eb , which is publicly known; but since Db is a secret known only
to Bastien, only he can generate such a message. So anyone receiving g(Db ;M )
can be sure that it originated with Bastien3.
Can we combine the two so as to ensure both secrecy? Yes; Bastien rst
signs, then encrypts his message. In other words, he sends g(Ea ; g(Db ;M )) to
Albumen. Only she can decrypt the outer layer, since this requires her secret
key; and she then can verify that Bastien has sent the message, since only he
could have generated g(Db ;M ).
This nearly solves our problem. However, good public-key encryption func-
tions are costly in terms of the time taken to encrypt and decrypt messages.
Whilst small quantities of data can be sent in this way, it is unrealistic to deal
with large messages using public-key encryption. (Remember that a \message"
might be almost anything|say, a large picture le.) The best hardware imple-
mentations of the (private-key) cryptosystem DES are more than a thousand
times faster than the fastest hardware designed to implement (public-key) RSA.
One sensible approach is to combine the public-key and private-key crypto-
graphic methods so as to avoid the disadvantages of each. Albumen and Bastien
use public-key cryptography to assure each other that they really are who they
claim to be, and to agree on a key which they can then use with private-key
2The observant reader might have noticed an apparent inconsistency with the hyphenation
or otherwise of \public key". The rule is that when \public key" is a noun, it should be written
as two words; but the adjective \public-key" is hyphenated, hence \public-key cryptography".
Other terms such as \private key" are handled analogously.
3We are ignoring for the moment the issue of freshness. Although anyone receiving such
a message knows that Bastien generated it, he cannot be certain that Bastien generated it
recently, or intended it for him. An intruder might replay an old (signed) message in a dierent
context, where the message could have a meaning that Bastien never intended it to have. For
this reason, it is prudent in some circumstances to include in the message a timestamp, that
is, a representation of the current time, to prevent such a tactic.
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encryption. (It is usual to agree on a key which will only be used for the current
communications session; and so this key is often called a session key.) Provided
that they are careful with their use of the public-key encryption, they will be
correctly authenticated, and they will have maintained the secrecy of the session
key.
Another common solution is to use public-key cryptography to agree on a
small amount of secret information, and then to include this secret information
in future public-key encryptions. It is usual to have a small public key but a
much larger secret key; and since smaller keys result in faster encryption, it is
quicker to encrypt a message than it is to sign it. But if the encrypted message
contains data known only to sender and receiver, then there can be no doubt as
to the origin of the message; and so an expensive signature can be avoided.
But exactly how are they to agree on a session key, or on the secret data?
1.4 Security protocols
A security protocol is the general form of a sequence of communications designed
to establish one or more security-related goals, for example, authentication of
one or both parties or secrecy of a particular piece of information. It is the
general form in the sense that the protocol will contain free variables which will
be instantiated with dierent actual values each time the protocol is used. Each
new attempt to use the protocol is called a run of the protocol. In a given run
of a protocol, the sender of the rst message is called the initiator (since it is he
who is attempting to make contact) and the receiver of that message is referred
to as the responder (since he is the one accepting or refusing the oer of setting
up a communications session).
Dierent protocols might have dierent starting assumptions and dierent
goals. Some protocols assume the existence of a trusted server, whose job it
is to maintain a list of public keys and respond to requests for public keys for
particular users; others assume that the required public keys are already known
to the agents taking part in the protocol run. Some protocols are concerned to
ensure that the run of the protocol nishes within a certain amount of time of
starting; others are not.
Obviously any two runs of a given protocol should in general not be identical
in terms of the data they contain. For if they were, then an intruder could
remember the exact sequence of messages, and then imitate either side in a
protocol run by replaying the messages he had heard. (An intruder does not,
of course, have to understand an encrypted message in order to be able to
hear it and replay it in its encrypted form, any more than he needs to be able
to understand Spanish to copy a page out of a Spanish novel.) To this end,
protocols often make use of nonces|free variables which are to be instantiated
with a random value selected by the rst agent to send a message containing
the nonce. They are often used in order to achieve authentication: a nonce
is selected and sent encrypted under a certain key; the recipient decrypts the
nonce and sends it back, showing that he holds the key in question. (Since the
nonce is fresh, that is, only just generated, the recipient cannot have had the
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nonce in his possession already; and must therefore have been able to decrypt
the encrypted nonce.) This is known as a nonce challenge.
1.4.1 Notation
The standard notation for describing a protocol is as follows. The messages of
a protocol run are numbered, and each message species an origin, an intended
destination, and message contents. The contents of the message may consist
of nonces, agent identities, keys, and timestamps: these can be unencrypted,
or encrypted under a specied key. A message component may also be formed
by taking a sequence of two or more smaller components; encryption may be
applied to these larger entities.
As an example, we describe the three message version of the Needham-
Schroeder Public-Key Protocol [6]. This protocol aims to achieve mutual au-
thentication, and to ensure the secrecy of the nonces Na and Nb used in the
protocol. It assumes that, at the beginning, the public keys of A and B are
known to everyone. (There is a seven message version of the protocol involving
communications with a trusted server so as to obtain the appropriate public
keys; but for the purposes of this introduction, we will consider the three mes-
sage version.)
Message 1: A! B : fA;NagPK (B)
Message 2: B ! A : fNa ;NbgPK (A)
Message 3: A! B : fNbgPK (B)
In the rst message, A uses B's public key to encrypt her identity (A)
together with a fresh nonce Na , and sends the result of this encryption to B.
This constitutes a nonce challenge: if the responder really is B, then he should
be able to decrypt the rst message and so learn the value of Na . So, B responds
to this challenge by decrypting the rst component, choosing a new nonce Nb ,
encrypting both nonces under A's public key, and sending this encryption back
to A. This, it would seem, should assure A of the authenticity of B. It also
provides a return nonce challenge to A, who has not yet been authenticated
(since anyone could have generated the rst message of the protocol run). If
A is who he claims to be, then he (and only he) should be able to decrypt the
second message and learn the value of Nb . He does this, and also checks that
the value of Na returned to him matches the one he sent out; and nally he
encrypts Nb under B's public key and sends it back to B. B, when he receives
this, checks that the value of Nb is correct|which should presumably convince
him that he really is talking to A.
In addition, no-one listening in should have had the appropriate information
to decrypt any of the messages; and hence Na and Nb should now be secrets
known only to A and B. Either of these (or some combination of them) can
now be used as a session key for private-key communication between A and B.
(It is vital to note the dierence between composition followed by encryption,
as denoted by
Message 2: B ! A : fNa ;NbgPK (A)
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and encryption followed by composition, resulting in
Message 2: B ! A : fNagPK (A); fNbgPK (A)
The latter is far easier for an intruder to interfere with. If the intruder knows
neither Na nor Nb , but knows a nonce Nc , then in the latter case he can intercept
the message and change it to
Message 2: I (B)! A : fNagPK (A); fNigPK (A)
by simply replaying the rst half of the message, and tacking on his own addi-
tion. (The I (B) indicates that the message is being sent by I, impersonating
B.) But with the former, he cannot generate
Message 2: I (B)! A : fNa ;NigPK (A)
because he would need to know Na to produce the encrypted component.)
1.4.2 Attacking the protocol
At this point, the main problem with security protocols should be noted. The
reader may have observed the somewhat guarded language used when describing
the authentication supposedly achieved using the above protocol. The argument
for its correctness seems convincing, and it is hard to see how an intruder could
nd a security loophole. But the protocol is nevertheless awed. The respon-
der is indeed correctly authenticated|the intruder cannot set up a fake session
impersonating the responder. However, the intruder can impersonate the initia-
tor; he can (in appropriate circumstances) set up a session with B, convincing
B that he is talking to A. In addition, he discovers the value of both nonces
used in the protocol run, and so knows the session key at the end. This is a
devastating breach of security.
The following attack|that is, a sequence of communications resulting in a
security breach|on the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol was discov-
ered by Gavin Lowe; for a full account see [7]. The attack consists of two
concurrent runs of the protocol, which we label as  and . In run , A tries to
set up a session with I (who is a dishonest intruder, but nonetheless a valid user
of the network, and so may participate in valid sessions). In run , I successfully
impersonates A to set up a session with B.
Message :1: A! I : fA;NagPK (I )
Message :1: I (A)! B : fA;NagPK (B)
Message :2: B ! I (A) : fNa ;NbgPK (A)
Message :2: I ! A : fNa ;NbgPK (A)
Message :3: A! I : fNbgPK (I )
Message :3: I (A)! B : fNbgPK (B)
A tries to initiate a session with I, the intruder; and so starts by sending
his identity and a fresh nonce Na , encrypted under I's public key. I then starts
a run of the protocol with B, but pretending to be A; he sends A's identity,
and the same nonce Na , all encrypted under B's public key. B responds as he
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should, by returning the nonce with a new nonce Nb ; but, because he thinks
that he is running the protocol with A, he encrypts the reply under A's public
key. This works as intended: I cannot decrypt the reply that B sends him in
:2, because he is not who he claims to be; he does not possess A's secret key.
However, I is also in the middle of a run of the protocol with A, who is at this
point expecting a reply to his :1 message. So, even though I cannot understand
the message he has just received, he passes the whole message on to A as :2.
The protocol now requires A to respond to the nonce challenge presented him
by I; so A is kind enough to decrypt the nonces and send Nb back to I under I's
public key! This is exactly the information I needs to complete run  with B;
he nishes by sending the newly-discovered Nb back to B encrypted under B's
public key. Both runs of the protocol have now been successfully completed;
A and I commit themselves to a communications session, and, crucially, B
commits himself to a communications session with I, thinking that he is talking
to A.
The fact that the attack is dicult to spot is of no comfort. If a proposed
protocol is awed, then we need to know before we put it to any real-world
use where security is important. We need a method of discovering attacks on
proposed protocols, so that loopholes can be corrected at the design stage.
1.5 Communicating Sequential Processes
Communicating Sequential Processes, or CSP, is an algebra for describing pro-
cesses and their interactions with each other. It is an appropriate choice of
notation for describing our protocol system; and as such, we give here a brief
introduction to the language.
CSP was developed by Tony Hoare during the early 1980s ot Oxford Uni-
versity, and his book [1] provides a solid introduction to the subject. However,
since its birth, a much more substantial theory of CSP than presented in the
book has been developed for analysing processes, and some of the notation has
changed. For this reason, the reader is advised to consult the more recent [2].
1.5.1 Events
A CSP system functions by engaging in events. These events are regarded as
instantaneous actions; there is a denite order in which events happen, with no
possibility of them occurring simultaneously (although, as we shall see, more
than one process may be involved in any one event). The entire set of events
which may occur in the system is denoted by .
1.5.2 Processes
The complete system in a CSP program is a process, usually composed of two
or more smaller processes. These processes can in turn be dened in terms of
other processes, or can be made from still smaller processes.
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There is one \atomic" process, denoted as STOP, which never engages in
any event. Other processes are dened in terms of the following operators.
The process x ! P rst engages in the event x , and then behaves like
the process P ; this arrow is known as the prex operator. Processes may be
recursively dened in this way: for instance, we can write
LAZY = wake ! eat ! sleep ! LAZY
which produces a process LAZY that performs wake, eat , sleep in a continuous
cycle.
We can force two processes P and Q to co-operate with each other by com-
bining them in parallel, creating the process P j[A ]jQ , where A is a set of events.
This process allows P and Q to work independently on events outside of the set
A, with no synchronisation; but an event from A may only happen when both
P and Q are ready to engage in it, and, when this is the case, the two processes
participate in a single occurrence of the event.
A special case of the above is when A = ;; in this case, there is no interaction
between P and Q , and the new process behaves like P and Q running side by
side. We call this interleaving, and write it as P jjj Q .
A slightly more powerful version of the parallel operator is available in the
form of P j[X jY ]j Q , in which P is only allowed to engage in events in X , Q
can only perform events in Y , and they must synchronise on events in X \ Y .
(This version of the operator is sometimes written as P X kY Q , as it is, for
example, in [2].)
The process P 2 Q can behave like P , or like Q , depending on what events
are oered to it. Because it is the environment rather than the process which
determines which course of action is taken, we call this the external choice
operator.
For each of the parallel, interleaving and external choice operators, there is
an indexed form allowing the operator to work over a larger set of processes
rather than just two operands. They are written
Indexed parallel kn
i=1
(Pi ;Ai)
Indexed parallel jjjn
i=1
Pi
Indexed external choice 2
n
i=1
Pi
In the case of the indexed parallel operator, the above is equivalent to
P1 j[A1 jA2 [    [An ]j (: : : (Pn 1 j[An 1 jAn ]j Pn) : : : )
1.5.3 Traces
A trace of a process is a nite sequence of events which it may perform. Thus,
since STOP never performs any events, its only trace is the empty sequence:
traces(STOP) = fhig
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For our process LAZY above, its traces are
traces(LAZY ) = fhi; hwakei; hwake; eati; hwake; eat ; sleepi;
hwake; eat ; sleep;wakei; : : : g
1.5.4 Renement
All our work will be grounded in the traces model of CSP: if, for two processes
P and Q , we have that traces(P) = traces(Q), then we will regard P and Q as
identical. More advanced models concern themselves not only with what a pro-
cess might do but also with what it might refuse to do|some processes, under
this view, decide nondeterministically whether or not to allow certain events
to happen. However, for our work on security protocols, all our specications
will be requirements that particular undesirable states should not obtain; not
that desirable actions are guaranteed to occur. If we were concerned with the
latter, then we would need to check that our system could never refuse to do
something good, and we would need to employ a \higher" model; but since we
simply want to outlaw bad events, it will suce to check that those bad events
do not appear in the traces of the system. All work in this dissertation will be
taken to be in the traces model.
What do we mean when we say that a program meets a certain specica-
tion? We certainly are not looking for equality between the program and the
specication, for the programmer will often have made decisions left open by the
one drawing up the specication. The program may be more restrictive than
the specication in terms of the actions it permits; it may not be less. In other
words, anything the program allows must also be allowed by the specication.
In our language of traces, then, a program P meets a specication Q if and only
if
traces(P)  traces(Q)
which says that the specication can do all that the program can do, and pos-
sibly more. This idea is very important in CSP and in analysing systems; we
say that P renes Q (or that Q is rened by P) and we write
Q v P
If we want to emphasize that we are working in the traces model, then we do
so by writing
Q vT P
The process STOP never does anything, and hence can do no wrong; thus
it renes any process at all. For any process P ,
P v STOP
In addition, STOP is the strictest possible specication. Since it will not allow
the implementation to engage in any events, only STOP itself can meet the
specication:
STOP v P ) P = STOP
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1.6 Failures-Divergences Renement checker
Formal Systems, Europe Ltd. have produced a program called the Failures-
Divergences Renement checker (FDR), which takes a CSP specication and a
CSP implementation, and seeks to determine if the implementation renes the
specication. As the name suggests, the program can check for renement in
the failures-divergences model, which is the most sophisticated model. However,
it will also check for trace renement, and so will prove useful to us.
It works by exploring the state space of the specication and the imple-
mentation, to see if any state can be reached by the implementation which is
prohibited by the specication. Because of this, the state space of each must be
kept nite when coding for FDR. We will have cause to remember this later.
FDR takes CSP source les written in a notation similar to that described
above, but with slight changes to allow the source to be written with standard
ASCII characters. For details of the notation, and any other matters regarding
FDR, the reader should consult [8] or [2].
Chapter 2
Using FDR to analyse a
protocol in CSP
2.1 The plan
Our strategy will be to model Albumen and Bastien as separate processes, and
to build into these processes the communications which they are able to perform.
We will dene an INITIATOR process, which will be instructed to attempt to
start the protocol with the RESPONDER process, over a channel comm; these
will be carefully controlled so as to follow the exact pattern of the protocol as
laid out above, with no intruder-like actions. By invoking the process
INITIATOR j[ fjcommjg ]jRESPONDER
we will have a working model of a system with two honest agents running the
protocol as the designers intended.
This, of course, will not reveal any design aws in the protocol. We know
that if only honest agents are involved, no problems will arise; there is no-one
to learn secrets except those for whom they were intended, and no-one to be
incorrectly authenticated as Albumen or Bastien. So, we model a third process
INTRUDER. This process will interact with the other two, by communicating
with them either legitimately (as a valid user of the network with his own
identity), or dishonestly (by intercepting messages meant for someone else, or
impersonating another agent). He will also overhear any (usually encrypted)
messages sent between the honest agents.
As well as a channel comm, for genuine communications from one valid user
of the network to another, we will set up a channel take, communications along
which will represent messages intended for an honest user, but intercepted by
Innocence. There will also be a channel fake, on which Innocence will place mes-
sages when he is impersonating another user. Obviously, however, the behaviour
of the intruder should be invisible to the others; we cannot expect Albumen and
Bastien to check for messages on channel fake without suspicion being aroused!
From the point of view of Albumen and Bastien, comm, take and fake should
16
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all look identical. We will achieve this by renaming the channels take and fake.
Figure 2.1: The intruder's communication lines
The diagram in Figure 2.1 shows the lines of communication. The intruder
is eectively controlling the entire network, determining exactly who may see
each message. Note that we do not need any special channel to deal with the
intruder's ability to overhear messages; we will simply let any message passing
along comm to be seen by the intruder1.
The only restrictions on Innocence's actions are that
 he may not decode encrypted messages when he does not have the appro-
priate key
 he may not send messages when he does not possess the information re-
quired to create those messages|so that, for instance, before he may send
the message fNa ;NbgKab to anyone he must have already seen and under-
stood the nonces Na and Nb and the key Kab , or else have already seen
the entire message in its encrypted form
The process INTRUDER will therefore keep a careful track of what Innocence
knows and what he does not know; each time he overhears or intercepts a
message, the contents of the message will be added to his knowledge.
In addition, each time something is learnt, the intruder checks to see if he
may deduce anything from what he knows already. For instance, suppose he
1In fact, even this is logically redundant, since any message can be taken by the intruder,
and then re-faked. It is there purely to make the communication patterns more readily
understandable.
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rst overhears the message
fNa ;NbgKab
without having previously learnt any of the components of this message. The
encrypted message as a whole can be added to his knowledge; but neither nonce
is known to Innocence since he cannot decrypt the message. Suppose that he
then intercepts the message
Kab
consisting of just one key. He is now considered to have learnt the key Kab ; but
since he now possesses this key, he can decrypt the encrypted nonces overheard
previously, and learn them too. He will have a deduction rule which states that
ffM gK ;Kg ` M
or, in other words, from an encrypted component and the encrypting key, learn
the unencrypted component.
Now what possible tactics are we going to program Innocence to try? What
sorts of tricks might the intruder need in order to nd an attack? And, more
crucially, how are we going to be certain that we have thought of all the tactics
which might result in victory for Innocence? This is a serious problem: we
have already seen that attacks can be dicult to spot, and the cunning tricks
employed by the intruder are likely to be equally hard to nd.
Fortunately, FDR comes to our rescue|and here we see the strength of using
this method to analyse protocols. We need not concern ourselves with specic
tactics, because we can leave the model of the intruder suciently broad to
cover all possible tactics. FDR will search the state space to nd any valid trace
leading to a security breach; so provided that we restrict our intruder only by
what he cannot do, rather than what he might or might not choose to do, we
will explore all possible courses of intruder action. As a result,
1. we are much more likely to nd an attack, since we are no longer trusting
in our own guesswork about how Innocence might proceed
2. if FDR fails to nd an attack, then we can be sure that our protocol is
safe to use in the presence of real intruders; we can be condent that a
spy could not break the protocol, since, whatever course of action he tries,
FDR has thought of it already!
2.2 Modelling the protocol
In this section we give a sketch of the CSP model of the system, containing
the initiator, responder and intruder. The full code is laid out in Appendix A
on page 50, where it is given in machine-readable CSP (sometimes known as
CSPM ); the code can be easily loaded into FDR and the renement checks run.
Here, we show the most important and interesting components of the system,
and explain their purpose and function.
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2.2.1 Basic data types, sets and channels
The whole notion of secrecy revolves around what facts the intruder can or
cannot learn. These facts can be atomic|keys, nonces, and agent identities|
or compound|sequences of smaller facts, or the encryption of a fact under a
key. This basic data type underlies the entire system, and so we start by dening
fact.
datatype fact = Sq. Seq(fact) |
Encrypt. (fact, fact) |
Albumen | Bastien | Innocence |
pka | pkb | pki |
ska | skb | ski |
Na | Nb | Ni
This provides us with an innite, recursive data type, whose atomic elements
are the three network users, their public and secret keys, and three nonces.
We also will need to be able to refer to the set of available nonces, and public
keys; and we will require a way of mapping users to public keys. Furthermore,
since we are dealing with public-key cryptography, we need a function which
returns the inverse of a particular key, that is, the key k 1 required to decrypt
messages encrypted under a specied key k . For the denitions of the sets
nonce, user and key, and the functions pk and inverse, see Appendix A.
Several channels will be used for communicating messages, and for signalling
that certain states have been reached. We dene
channel protocol:user.user
channel comm,take,fake:user.user.message
channel secret:user.user.atom
channel initgo,respgo,initdone,respdone:user.user
to this end. The channel protocol will be regarded as a request to start a run of
the protocol; so that the event protocol.Albumen.Bastien will cause Albumen
to attempt to start the protocol with Bastien. The comm, take and fake chan-
nels represent messages passing from user to user, with the last two signifying
intruder action in the form of intercepting a message and creating a fake message
respectively. The purpose of secret is to ag when something intended to be
secret has been leaked to the intruder; the event secret.Albumen.Bastien.x
will only occur when Albumen believes he is talking to Bastien (or vice versa),
and further believes that x is a secret known only to those two, but in fact the
intruder has caused a security breach by learning the value of x. Finally, the
four channels initgo, respgo, initdone and respdone are used to indicate,
respectively, that the initiator is engaged in a run of the protocol (and the data
passed along the channel will show who the initiator and supposed responder
are), that the responder is engaged in a run of the protocol, that the initiator
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has (he believes) successfully completed a run of the protocol, and that the re-
sponder has (again, as far as he is aware) successfully completed a run of the
protocol.
It should be clear already roughly how we will test at the end for correct
authentication and for condentiality of supposedly secret information. If the
initiator is to be authenticated without incident then we simply specify that if
Bastien believes that he, as responder, has been running the protocol with Al-
bumen, then Albumen has indeed started a run of the protocol with Bastien. In
other words, an occurrence of respdone.Albumen.Bastienmust be preceded by
an initgo.Albumen.Bastien event. The test for authentication of the respon-
der will be similar. To discover any secrecy violations, we specify that no event of
the form secret.Albumen.Bastien.x should ever occur, and test to see whether
this is in fact the case. Events of the form secret.Albumen.Innocence.x (and
corresponding events with Innocence as initiator) should not be outlawed|these
only occur when Innocence is taking part in a legitimate run of the protocol,
and any secrets revealed to him as a result of such a run are his by right.
2.2.2 The initiator
We are now ready to dene the process controlling the behaviour of the initiator
of the protocol. The initiator
1. receives a request to start the protocol with a particular user
2. indicates that he is running the protocol (using initgo)
3. sends an appropriate rst message to the user in question, using the nonce
given in the parameters of the process
4. accepts back any second message, provided that the message
(a) is encrypted under the initiator's public key
(b) contains the nonce sent out under the rst message
5. sends back the nonce just received, encrypted under the responder's public
key, according to the protocol specication
6. indicates that he has successfully completed a run of the protocol
7. states that the two nonces used in the protocol run should be known only
to the initiator and the responder
and so the denition is as follows
INITIATORx(a,na) = protocol.a?b -> initgo.a.b ->
comm.a.b.encrypt(pk(b),Sq.<a,na>) ->
([] nb:nonce @
comm.b.a.encrypt(pk(a),Sq.<na,nb>) ->
comm.a.b.encrypt(pk(b),nb) ->
initdone.a.b ->
(secret.a.b.na -> STOP
[] secret.a.b.nb -> STOP))
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When instantiated, we will give the initiator an identity (Albumen) and a nonce
(Na).
Now we recall that the intruder will be making use of channels take and
fake for his questionable practices; and we note that the denition above allows
Albumen to communicate only on the channel comm. We could code into the
initiator the possibility that messages will come in on channel fake and leave on
channel take; but we would lose some of the beauty of the model by doing so, for
we would like such messages to appear genuine to the initiator. We want it to be
impossible for the initiator to distinguish between fake and authentic (incoming)
messages, and between successful and intercepted (outgoing) messages, rather
than this distinction being something which the initiator merely chooses to
ignore. But it is important nonetheless to realise that coding the channels into
the initiator, whilst obscure and aesthetically doubtful, would certainly produce
the correct results.
Our method is to make subtle use of renaming, that is, changing the name
of a channel to the outside world without directly modifying the process in
question. Incoming communications on what the initiator regards as channel
comm either come genuinely from that channel, or come from channel fake; and
outgoing ones leave either on comm, or on take. We therefore rename as follows:
INITIATOR(a,na) = INITIATORx(a,na)
[[comm.a <- comm.a, comm.a <- take.a]]
[[comm.b.a <- comm.b.a,
comm.b.a <- fake.b.a | b <- user]]
Note that we only need to rename the parts of the channel which concern the
initiator.
This completes the description of the initiator.
2.2.3 The responder
The responder acts in a similar fashion. He
1. receives an appropriate rst message from a user who is attempting to
start the protocol with him; he will accept, at this point, any nonce from
any user
2. indicates that he is running the protocol (using respgo)
3. sends back the second message of the protocol run, using the nonce he has
just received, and the nonce given in the parameters of the process
4. receives the nonce he has just sent out, now encrypted under his own
public key
5. indicates that he has successfully completed a run of the protocol
6. states that the two nonces used in the protocol run should be known only
to the initiator and the responder
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giving rise to the denition
RESPONDERx(b,nb) = ([] na:nonce @
[] a:user @
comm.a.b.encrypt(pk(b),Sq.<a,na>) ->
respgo.a.b ->
comm.b.a.encrypt(pk(a),Sq.<na,nb>) ->
comm.a.b.encrypt(pk(b),nb) ->
respdone.a.b ->
(secret.a.b.na -> STOP
[] secret.a.b.nb -> STOP))
We rename the process RESPONDERx in an analogous way to that by which
we dealt with INITIATORx; this gives us the RESPONDER that we want.
2.2.4 The intruder-free network
To join the initiator and responder processes together, we put them in parallel,
synchronising on the channel comm. This process, which we will call SYSTEMx,
represents a network with no intruder in which Albumen and Bastien may en-
gage in a single run of the protocol.
SYSTEMx = INITIATOR(Albumen,Na)
[|{|comm|}|]
RESPONDER(Bastien,Nb)
Now it remains only for us to dene the intruder, and join him to the the
SYSTEMx we have just created.
2.2.5 The intruder
The process describing the intruder is somewhat complicated, and is responsible
for about half of the total code. The basic strategy is to set up deduction rules
by which the intruder can infer facts from those facts which he already knows; to
create a process for each possible fact which the intruder may wish to discover,
with a switchable state to indicate whether the intruder is aware of the fact; to
give these facts the capability of being learnt or inferred when appropriate; and
nally to link all these processes together in parallel in a suitable way. The state
of the intruder will therefore be determined entirely by what facts he knows;
and as more messages come his way, his knowledge will grow accordingly|either
directly, by overhearing a fact, or indirectly, by deducing facts from others in
his possession.
Deduction rules
There are four ways in which the intruder can deduce information from that
which he already possesses:
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1. if he holds a sequence of facts, then he may discover the value of any
element of that sequence
2. if he holds any n (not necessarily distinct) facts, then he may produce any
sequence of length n containing only those facts
3. he may, from any fact f and key k which he knows, create the encryption
of f under k
4. whenever he has an encrypted fact in his possession, and also holds the
inverse of the key under which the fact was encrypted, he may decrypt it
and discover the fact
Of course, these rules will often be used in sequence to make complex deductions.
If the intruder overhears fNa ;Nbgk when he holds the inverse of key k , he will
rst use Rule 4 to learn the sequence2 fNa ;Nbg; and then use Rule 1 on the
preceding page twice to discover the values of the nonces Na and Nb .
For each rule, and each set A of facts, we create a set of pairs (X ; f ) of
sets of facts X  A and individual facts f such that the rule can be invoked to
deduce f if the intruder knows everything in X . These four families of sets will
be joined together to produce one large family of sets, again parametrised by a
set A of facts, representing all possible deductions from the set A.
deduceelt(A) = {({Sq.m}, getelt(i,m)) | Sq.m<-A, i<-{0..#m-1}}
deduceseq(A) = {({getelt(i,m) | i<-{0..#m-1}}, Sq.m) | Sq.m<-A}
deduceenc(A) = {({m,pk}, Encrypt.(pk,m)) | Encrypt.(pk,m)<-A}
deducedec(A) = {({Encrypt.(pk,m),inverse(pk)}, m) |
Encrypt.(pk,m)<-A}
deductions(A) = Union({deduceelt(A),deduceseq(A),
deduceenc(A),deducedec(A)})
Now we want to nd a suitable A so that we can produce the set of all
deductions relevant to the system we are analysing. We cannot allow FDR to
consider the set of all possible deductions over all possible facts, for fact is an
innite data type and FDR can only deal with nite sets. But since the messages
of the protocol are xed in form, and the numbers of nonces and users and keys
are nite, the set of all possible messages is nite; so we dene a set facts
which consists of all the facts which could conceivably turn up as messages or
subcomponents of messages. There is no way that the intruder can ever learn
anything else from what he overhears of protocol runs.
facts = Union({components(x) | x<-message})
alldeductions = deductions(facts)
2It is perhaps unfortunate that standard protocol notation uses braces (\f" and \g") to
denote an ordered tuple, rather than an unordered set, as is more usual in mathematics.
However, as this notation for protocols is ubiquitous, it would be imprudent to depart from
it.
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We do not include here the denition of components, or message, for which
the reader is referred to the appendix. The function components is designed to
split a message into all its component parts; and hence facts will consist of all
component parts of all possible messages.
Known facts
The intruder does not start life completely ignorant. He knows the identities of
all three users, he knows all three public keys, he holds his own secret key, and
he knows a nonce; and, of course, he should also be aware, from the beginning,
of any facts deducible from this initial knowledge. We represent this with the set
known, dened to be the closure under the deductive rules of the initially known
atomic facts. The closure is determined by repeatedly applying all relevant
deduction rules to the set, until no more deductions can be made, hence
closure(A) = let Z = {f | (X,f)<-alldeductions, diff(X,A)=={}}
within
if diff(Z,A)=={} then A else closure(union(Z,A))
known = closure(Union({user,key,{ski,Ni}}))
As well as dening what is known at the beginning, we will need sets deter-
mining everything that can be known by the intruder|which is the closure of
all possible messages together with his initial knowledge|and everything that
can be learnt, which is this same closure, but without the facts known at the
start (which, of course, the intruder does not need to learn).
canknow = closure(union(message,known))
canlearn = diff(canknow,known)
We are now in a position to reduce the set of \sensible" deductions still
further. Some of the deductions might be trivial in that the conclusion is already
contained in the set of facts required to make the inference; some might require
facts which the intruder could never know (since they cannot arrive in any
message in any form); and some might have conclusions which are outside the
scope of the intruder's enquiry, that is, outside of canlearn. Therefore, we
remove all these irrelevant deductions by dening
usefulddct = {(A,f) | (A,f)<-alldeductions,
member(f,canlearn),
diff(A,canknow)=={},
not member(f,A)}
A process for each fact
As stated before, we shall dene a process controlling each learnable fact, and
each such process will have two possible states to indicate whether or not the
intruder knows the fact. He will learn new facts on a channel hear, and will
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speak forth facts in his possession on channel say; and since the intruder can
only receive or send complete messages, these channels will be restricted to
carrying members of the set message. He will make deductions with the help of a
channel deduce, and all data on this channel will come from the set usefulddct
as dened above.
channel say,hear:message
channel deduce:usefulddct
Suppose a fact is known to the intruder. Then, if it is a message, he may
say it, or even hear it again; he may use the fact as part of a deduction rule to
learn a new fact; or, if the fact is atomic, he may indicate that he has learnt a
secret not intended for him by participating in a secret event. (This secret
event can only occur if also allowed by the initiator or responder, that is, if
someone else is indicating that it is a secret to which the intruder should not
have access.) So we dene
know(f) = member(f,message) &
(say.f -> know(f) [] hear.f -> know(f)) []
([]x:{(A,z) | (A,z)<-usefulddct, member(f,A)} @
deduce.x -> know(f)) []
member(f,atom) & secret?a?b.f -> know(f)
If the fact is not known, then the intruder may hear it (if it is a complete
message), or deduce it from other facts. This latter possibility can only happen
if the processes controlling those other facts are willing to participate in the
deduction event, which will be the case if and only if he knows all of the necessary
facts required to make the deduction.
dontknow(f) = member(f,message) & hear.f -> know(f) []
([]x:{(A,z) | (A,z)<-usefulddct, f==z} @
deduce.x -> know(f))
This deals only with facts in canlearn; we dene separately a process con-
trolling all the facts known from the beginning. The intruder can say or hear
any of these facts, and, as above, can indicate that he has learnt a secret.
sayhearknown = []x:inter(known,message) @
(say.x -> sayhearknown
[] hear.x -> sayhearknown
[] member(x,atom) &
secret?a?b.x -> sayhearknown)
Now since we are to link these processes together in parallel, we need to
dene the alphabet of each process. A process controlling a fact needs to be
involved in
 any deduction with the fact as a requirement
 any deduction of the fact itself
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 the intruder saying the fact (if the fact is a message)
 the intruder hearing the fact (if the fact is a message)
 any indication of a secret having been discovered
giving rise to the following denition:
alphabet(f) = Union({
{deduce.(A,x) | (A,x)<-usefulddct,f==x},
{deduce.(A,x) | (A,x)<-usefulddct,member(f,A)},
if member(f,message) then {say.f, hear.f} else {},
if member(f,atom) then
{secret.a.b.f | a<-user, b<-user} else {}
})
Forming the intruder
It is now a simple matter to link the processes together in parallel, with their
respective alphabets, to create the process controlling the intruder; and as the
deductions are of concern only to the intruder, we choose to hide them. Since
sayhearknown has no event in common with any of the processes controlling
individual facts, it can be interleaved with the parallel composition of these
other processes. Thus
INTRUDERx = chase((|| f:canlearn @ [alphabet(f)]
dontknow(f))\{|deduce|})
||| sayhearknown
The chase operator drastically reduces the state space which FDR will have
to search when it looks for attacks. The process chase(P) behaves like P ex-
cept that whenever chase(P) has the option of performing a hidden action, it
will do so. If, indeed, there are several possible hidden actions available, then
any of them might be chosen by chase(P). In this case, the hidden actions are
deductions; but since the order of the deductions makes no dierence to the
nal knowledge when all possible deductions have been performed, and since
following all the deductions can never do any harm to the intruder, our chased
intruder will be equivalent to the unchased version. But when several deduc-
tions are possible, only one path through these deductions will ever be followed,
cutting down the number of states which FDR needs to consider. Care needs to
be taken when applying the chase operator; but here it works to great eect.
(For more details on chase, see [8].)
When the intruder says a message, he is really sending it to another user
via a fake. And he hears a message from channels take and comm. As with the
initiator and responder, we need to apply renaming to our intruder to link the
saying and hearing with comm, take and fake.
INTRUDER = INTRUDERx [[say <- say, say <- hear]]
[[hear.f <- comm.a.b.f,
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hear.f <- take.a.b.f | a.b.f<-allcomm]]
[[say.f <- fake.a.b.f | a.b.f<-allcomm]]
This completes the process controlling the intruder.
2.2.6 The network including the intruder
To join the intruder to the original SYSTEMx, we link them in parallel. The
intruder and the network he is joining must co-operate on channels comm, take
and fake, and also when indicating that a secret has been leaked. Thus
SYSTEM = SYSTEMx [|{|comm,take,fake,secret|}|] INTRUDER
denes the complete system, with initiator, responder and intruder. It is this
process that we must check against appropriate specications to see if the pro-
tocol functions correctly.
2.3 Checking the protocol
How might the protocol fail? It is designed to meet three security specications:
1. authentication of the initiator, that is, to assure a responder who has
nished running the protocol with an agent who claims to be A that he
really is talking to A
2. authentication of the responder, that is, to assure an initiator who has
nished running the protocol with an agent who claims to be B that he
really is talking to B
3. secrecy of the nonces Na and Nb , which is to say that whenever two agents
A and B complete a run of the protocol using fresh nonces Na and Nb ,
then at this point they and only they know the values of the two nonces
We therefore have three renement checks, one for each of the above statements.
2.3.1 Authentication of the initiator
We wish to guarantee that no responder can ever complete the protocol unless
the supposed initiator has actually been running the protocol with him. In terms
of our model, we cannot allow respdone.Albumen.Bastien unless there has
previously been a corresponding initgo.Albumen.Bastien event. The spec-
ication process we require is, therefore, the process which allows any other
events to occur whenever they like, but requires that these two events should
be correctly paired. So we dene
auth_init_alph = {|initgo.Albumen.Bastien,
respdone.Albumen.Bastien|}
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auth_initx = initgo.Albumen.Bastien ->
respdone.Albumen.Bastien ->
auth_initx
auth_init = auth_initx ||| RUN(diff(Sigma,auth_init_alph))
where Sigma is the set of all events, and RUN(A) is the process which at each
stage allows any event from A.
Now we can test to see if our system meets the specication and so correctly
authenticates the initiator, by means of a line stating
assert auth_init [T= SYSTEM
2.3.2 Authentication of the responder
The test for authentication of the responder is somewhat similar|we insist
only that initdone.Albumen.Bastien should be preceded by a corresponding
respgo.Albumen.Bastien event. Accordingly, we dene
auth_resp_alph = {|respgo.Albumen.Bastien,
initdone.Albumen.Bastien|}
auth_respx = respgo.Albumen.Bastien ->
initdone.Albumen.Bastien ->
auth_respx
auth_resp = auth_respx ||| RUN(diff(Sigma,auth_resp_alph))
and test the renement check
assert auth_resp [T= SYSTEM
2.3.3 Secrecy specication
A secret event can occur only when an honest agent desires that a certain fact
should be kept secret, and yet the intruder knows that fact. If the agent is
sharing the secret with the intruder, then no security breach arises; but when
Albumen and Bastien are running the protocol, then such a state of aairs
constitutes a protocol failure.
We test to see if any events of a particular kind can occur by hiding all others
in the system, and checking whether the resulting process renes STOP. If the
check succeeds, then these events can never happen.
assert STOP [T= SYSTEM \ diff(Sigma,{|secret.Albumen.Bastien|})
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2.4 Discovering the attack
Running the above three renement checks through FDR reveals that the pro-
tocol fails to authenticate the initiator, although it does correctly authenticate
the responder; and that the intruder can discover secrets not intended for him.
2.4.1 Authentication failure
SYSTEM does not rene auth init. The FDR debugging window gives us the
following trace:
protocol.Albumen.Innocence
initgo.Albumen.Innocence
take.Albumen.Innocence.Encrypt.(pki,Sq.<Albumen,Na>)
fake.Albumen.Bastien.Encrypt.(pkb,Sq.<Albumen,Na>)
respgo.Albumen.Bastien
take.Bastien.Albumen.Encrypt.(pka,Sq.<Na,Nb>)
fake.Innocence.Albumen.Encrypt.(pka,Sq.<Na,Nb>)
take.Albumen.Innocence.Encrypt.(pki,Nb)
fake.Albumen.Bastien.Encrypt.(pkb,Nb)
respdone.Albumen.Bastien
This corresponds exactly to the attack which we presented in Section 1.4.2 on
page 11. At the end of the trace, Bastien indicates (by participating in the
event respdone.Albumen.Bastien) that he has nished running the protocol,
and that he believes that Albumen was the initiator. However, there is no
corresponding initgo.Albumen.Bastien event|Albumen has not in fact been
running the protocol with Bastien.
2.4.2 Secrecy failure
SYSTEM \ diff(Sigma,{|secret.Albumen.Bastien|}) does not rene STOP.
However, this is clear from the failure of the protocol to authenticate the ini-
tiator: when the intruder sets up a fake session impersonating the initiator, the
responder naturally claims the existence of certain facts known only to himself
and Albumen, because he believes Albumen to be the initiator. But since the
intruder is playing this ro^le, he knows the secrets.
The failure of this renement check therefore adds no new information; it
simply demonstrates that a single aw in the protocol can cause the protocol
to fail in two ways at the same time.
2.5 Fixing the protocol
The aw in the protocol is a result of the weak structure of the second message|
Innocence successfully replays to Albumen a second message which he has heard
from Bastien, because there is nothing in the message to indicate its origin. (Its
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intended destination is implicitly specied by the fact that it is encrypted under
Albumen's public key, so that only Albumen could interpret it.) The attack can
be defeated by changing the second message from
Message 2: B ! A : fNa ;NbgPK (A)
to
Message 2: B ! A : fB ;Na ;NbgPK (A)
This prevents the intruder from replaying the message he hears, because whereas
he intercepts
Message :2: B ! I (A) : fB ;Na ;NbgPK (A)
he needs to send out
Message :2: I ! A : fI ;Na ;NbgPK (A)
which he cannot produce from the facts in his possession.
We now adapt our model to reect this change and ensure that there are no
other attacks waiting to be discovered. There are only three small modications
to make:
1. the set of all messages must be updated to reect the fact that the second
messages of a protocol run now take a dierent form
2. the initiator must be primed to expect the new form of second message
3. the responder should be instructed to include his identity in the second
message
2.5.1 Modifying the set of messages
The set message is simply the union of the sets of rst messages, second messages
and third messages. Rather than modify the denition of message, we update
msg2 from
msg2 = {encrypt(pk,Sq.<na,nb>) |
pk<-key, na<-nonce, nb<-nonce}
to
msg2 = {encrypt(pk,Sq.<z,na,nb>) |
z<-user, pk<-key, na<-nonce, nb<-nonce}
2.5.2 Modifying the initiator
The middle section of the denition of INITIATORx changes from
...
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([] nb:nonce @
comm.b.a.encrypt(pk(a),Sq.<na,nb>) ->
...
to
...
([] nb:nonce @
comm.b.a.encrypt(pk(a),Sq.<b,na,nb>) ->
...
2.5.3 Modifying the responder
Similarly, the denition of RESPONDERx changes from
...
respgo.a.b ->
comm.b.a.encrypt(pk(a),Sq.<na,nb>) ->
...
to
...
respgo.a.b ->
comm.b.a.encrypt(pk(a),Sq.<b,na,nb>) ->
...
2.5.4 Rechecking the adapted protocol
The modied version of the protocol can now be run through FDR, and it
can be veried that the adapted model does indeed satisfy all three security
specications.
This is a stronger result than simply showing that the adapted protocol
defeats the attack which we presented; it shows that, at least for our small
system with one initiator and one responder engaging in at most one run of the
protocol each, there is no attack which causes a misauthentication or leaking
of secret information. In fact, a result due to Gavin Lowe implies that if there
were an attack on an arbitrarily large system, then there would be an attack on
our small system|and hence the protocol is secure. The details of this proof
can be found in [7].
Chapter 3
Exploiting a weakness in
RSA
3.1 Cryptographic method-dependent attacks
It is important to realise that the attack presented in Section 1.4.2 in no way
relies on being able to \break" the encryption used. No guessing of keys is
performed, and no assumption is made about what cryptographic functions will
be used either in the protocol run or in the subsequent session. The encryption
can be as strong as we may care to imagine|the problem arises because it is
being used in an insecure manner.
Of course, if the intruder could break the encryption function|that is to
say, if he could nd a way to decipher encrypted messages without needing to
have the key|then his position would be irresistably strong. He could under-
stand every message sent. Clearly, some care needs to be taken in selecting an
encryption function.
As noted in Section 1.3.2, the most common public-key encryption function is
RSA. No feasible method of breaking RSA has been discovered (provided that a
large enough secret key is chosen), and it is not intolerably slow to apply, making
it a good choice in most circumstances. In addition, the speed of encryption
can be substantially increased by choosing a low public key exponent1|3 is a
popular choice. (A low value of the public key exponent does not aid an attacker
in nding the secret key.) However, as we shall see, a low public key exponent
can cause problems.
1RSA keys come in two parts|an exponent and a modulus. We shall not concern ourselves
here with the mathematics of RSA; it will suce to note that it is the size of the exponent
which is important in the following discussion.
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3.2 An attack on RSA with low public key ex-
ponents
In [9], Franklin and Reiter present an attack on RSA which assumes that the
public key used is 3. The attack shows that if we have two messages m1 and m2
which are in a known linear relation, that is, there exist known  and  such
that
m2 = m1 + 
and these messages are encrypted under a public key with exponent 3 (using
the same modulus), then we can recover m1 and m2 from their encryptions, 
and , and the (public) modulus.
A generalised version of this attack has been demonstrated in [10], in which
the number of messages, the degree of the relation between them, and the size of
the exponent are allowed to vary. The details of that attack are not important
for the purposes of this dissertation; but it turns out that with public key
exponents of up to around 232 the two-message linear relation attack will be
feasible.
What, in terms of the type of message we have been considering, does it
mean for two messages to be in a known linear relation? Suppose we know the
two messages
fNa ;Agk
and
fB ;Nagk
as well as knowing the identities A and B , and the public key k ; but we do not
know the value of Na . Now each atomic datum will be encoded as a bit-pattern,
and the composition of two atomic data will simply be the concatenation of these
bit-patterns. Therefore, if we call the length of the bit-pattern representing a
fact X as l(X ), and abuse the notation somewhat by allowing A, B and Na to
represent also the numbers determined by their bit-patterns, then we will have
fNa ;Ag = l(A):Na +A
and
fB ;Nag = l(Na):B +Na
These are then in the linear relation
fNa ;Ag = l(A):fB ;Nag+

A  B
l(A)2

and since we know the values of A and B , we can determine the coecients.
Thus, the attack applies and we can discover the value of Na . (It will be assumed
from here onwards that all encryption is RSA encryption using a public key with
a low exponent.)
Now this can be generalised. For any pair of distinct messages encrypted
under the same key, if the same component X of unknown value appears in
each message, and if all other components of both messages are known, then we
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will be able to nd a linear relation between the messages, mount the attack,
decrypt the messages, and so obtain the value of X .
Albumen and Bastien would be unwise indeed to assume that a potential
hacker does not know about this attack on RSA|as unwise, perhaps, as a
home owner who assumes that a burglar will not try the back door! A proto-
col designer should be equally concerned about the implications of the attack,
since he cannot know the environment in which the protocol will be used; he
should ensure that this method does not allow an intruder to break the protocol
in systems which employ low-exponent RSA as the cryptographic function of
choice.
Accordingly, we must increase the powers of the intruder in our model; In-
nocence should be permitted to make use of the above method.
3.3 A stronger intruder
How are we to encode the attack into the intruder? First we should note that the
mechanics of the attack need not be encoded at all. Recall that we implemented
encryption in a purely symbolic manner, allowing encrypt(pk,m) to represent
the encryption of message m under public key pk with no assumptions about
how the encryption was to be performed. We take a similiar approach to the
RSA attack, ignoring the means by which the messages would be broken in
practice, and simply allowing the intruder to deduce the values of components
of messages which succumb to the attack.
We use the word deduce advisedly. What better way of introducing the
intruder to the new method at his disposal than to encode it as a new deduction
rule? When certain items of information are in the intruder's possession, he can
use them to infer other facts; and this, of course, is exactly the task with which
the deduction rules were designed to cope.
In the next few sections, we build up the deduction rule (which will, in fact,
come in two smaller rules, deducersa and deduc2rsa) and include it in the
model of the intruder. We start with some functions and sets which we will
need for the denition.
3.3.1 The starting point
The attack relies on nding two components, encrypted under the same key,
with a common sub-component; and it is vital to note from the outset that this
sub-component need not be atomic in structure. If we know A and B , then the
attack will equally well apply to the two messages
fNa ;Nb ;Nc ;Nd ;Agk
and
fNa ;Nb ;Nc ;Nd ;Bgk
allowing us to discover the values of all four nonces, since there is a clear linear
relation between the two messages (they dier by A   B). What we require,
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therefore, is to know two messages with a common subsequence2, where every-
thing in both messages outside the subsequence is also known. In what follows,
we will concentrate heavily on the concept of subsequences, and extracting sub-
sequences from encrypted messages.
Since we can only deal with pairs of messages encrypted under the same key,
we start by partitioning the encrypted sequences according to the encrypting
key.
pkencs(A,pk) = {m | Encrypt.(pk,Sq.m)<-A}
We note that there is no point in creating deductions from encrypted messages
for which we already hold the decryption key; and so we construct the set of
keys for which the deduction rule will prove useful.
cantdec = {k | k<-key, not member(inverse(k),knownatoms)}
3.3.2 Functions for subsequences
Since there are no functions already dened for creating and maintaining sub-
sequences, we must construct our own. The attack relies not only on nding
a common subsequence, but also on knowing the values in the rest of the se-
quences; so the following functions build up the denition of subseq(m), which
takes a sequence m and returns the set of pairs (s;R) such that s is a non-empty
subsequence of m, and R is the set of values in m which occur outside of s.
(It seems at rst that we might very easily dene R = diff(set(m),set(s))
but this will in fact not work. Suppose that
m1 = fNa ;Nb ;P ;Nb ;Qg
and
m2 = fNa ;Nb ;C ;D ;Eg
Then we have a common subsequence of s = fNa ;Nbg; but knowing everything
in m1 outside of s means knowing R = fP ;Nb ;Qg, whereas the above denition
would give R = fP ;Qg. The problem has arisen because Nb occurs twice|
something which we must be prepared to deal with.)
We start by dening the initial segments, that is, the subsequences formed
by taking the rst part of the sequence; and we pair them together with the set
of values which appear in the rest of the sequence.
inits(<x>) = { (<x>,{}) }
inits(<x>^xs) = union({ (<x>,set(xs)) },
{ (<x>^y,R) | (y,R)<-inits(xs) })
Now an auxiliary function joinup, which takes a set of pairs (s;R) such as
inits produces, and a set J of values, and produces the set of all the (s;R[J ).
Its purpose will become apparent shortly.
joinup(Z,J) = { (s,union(R,J)) | (s,R)<-Z }
2We use the term throughout to mean a contiguous subsequence.
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Now we can dene the subsequences of a sequence (along with the sets of
other values, as in inits). There are no non-empty subsequences of the empty
sequence
subseq(<>) = {}
and the subsequences of a sequence hx ; : : : i are the initial segments, plus the
subsequences of the subsequence formed by removing x from the beginning. In
this latter case, the set of remaining values must be augmented with the value
of x , which now lies outside of the subsequence in consideration.
subseq(<x>^xs) = union(joinup(subseq(xs),{x}), inits(<x>^xs))
Although it will prove invaluable to have the subsequences paired with the
sets of remaining values, we will also need to access the subsequences without
their pairs. So we dene
justsubseq(m) = { s | (s,R)<-subseq(m) }
3.3.3 Common subsequences
We are much more concerned with common subsequences of two sequences,
rather than all the subsequence of a single sequence. When considering the
common subsequences, the paired set will need to be the set of all values ap-
pearing in at least one of the sequences, outside of the common subsequence|in
other words, the union of the two sets of remaining values. Hence
commonsubseq(m,n) = { (s,union(R,B)) | (s,R)<-subseq(m),
(t,B)<-subseq(n),
s==t }
We can cut down the size of this set somewhat. Given two sequences
m1 = fNa ;Nb ;P ;Qg
and
m2 = fNa ;Nb ;C ;Dg
then the function above will return the common subsequences as fNa ;Nbg, fNag
and fNbg. Although this is correct, the last two are redundant as far as the
RSA attack is concerned. With the rst common subsequence, the attack will
require us to know P , Q , C and D and will in return tell us the values of Na
and Nb ; with either of the other two smaller common subsequences, we will be
required to know more, and be given less in return. This is clearly unnecessary,
and will slow down FDR when it evaluates the set of deductions. Concentrating
our attention on only the maximal common subsequences|ones which are not
themselves subsequences of longer common subsequences|will not reduce the
eectiveness of the attack.
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A maximal common subsequence s is one such that the only common sub-
sequence of which s is a subsequence is s itself. Therefore
maxcommonsubseq(m,n) = let Q = commonsubseq(m,n)
within
{ (s,R) | (s,R)<-Q,
{ t | (t,B)<-Q,
member(s,justsubseq(t)) }=={s}}
We are nally ready to dene our deduction rule.
3.3.4 The deduction rule
Given two distinct subsequences m and n, encrypted under the same public
key k , and a maximal common subsequence s paired with the set of remaining
values R, the attack tells us that if we know fmgk , fngk and everything in R,
then we can deduce the values of everything in s. Since we can only deduce
once fact at a time, we will formulate one such deduction for each element of s.
This translates into the following denition of deducersa(A):
deducersa(A) = {(Union({{Encrypt.(pk,Sq.m), Encrypt.(pk,Sq.n)},
R
}),x) |
pk<-cantdec,
m<-pkencs(A,pk), n<-pkencs(A,pk),
m!=n,
(s,R)<-maxcommonsubseq(m,n),
x<-set(s)}
This nearly completes the deduction rule|however, there is one case not yet
allowed for. If we hold
fNa ;Agk
and
fNagk
then we certainly should be able to deduce the value of Na , provided that we
know A. This would appear to be covered in the above rule, for fNag should be a
subsequence of the two encryptions. In our model, however, the second message
will not be represented as Encrypt.(k,Sq.<Na>) (whereupon the rule would
apply) but as Encrypt.(k,Na) when the fact that the encrypted component is
not a sequence will cause it to be ignored. Clearly if one message is a sequence,
and the other is a component which appears in the sequence, then a deduction
rule should be created. (If neither message is a sequence, then there is no sense
in which there can be a common component of the messages, except if the
messages are identical|in which case we can deduce nothing anyway.) So we
introduce a second rule, called deduc2rsa(A), which deals with the case that
one message is not an encrypted sequence.
deduc2rsa(A) = {(Union({{Encrypt.(pk,Sq.m), Encrypt.(pk,n)},
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diff(set(m),{n})
}),n) |
pk<-cantdec,
m<-pkencs(A,pk),
n<-set(m)}
Note that, whereas with the previous rule we had to be careful about whether
the components of the subsequence appeared anywhere else in the messages, in
this case there is no such diculty. It does not matter how many times n
appears in the sequence m; there will still be a linear relation between m and
n. The attack will work provided that we know everything except for n.
3.3.5 Updating the set of deductions
The intruder simply follows whatever deductions he nds available for use in the
set deductions(fact) (or rather, a set derived from this). There is no need
to modify the intruder directly to instruct him to use the new rules; we just
change the denition of deductions to
deductions(A) = Union({deduceelt(A),deduceseq(A),
deduceenc(A),deducedec(A),
deducersa(A),deduc2rsa(A)})
The rest is automatic. The new deductions will be followed whenever Innocence
discovers suitable messages in his possession.
3.3.6 Checking the protocol
Running FDR on the xed version of our model of the Needham-Schroeder
Public-Key Protocol, with the new \strong" intruder, takes signicantly longer
than with the original \weak" intruder, since the set of deductions is now much
larger and takes more time to evaluate. Although the renement checks them-
selves are quite quick to perform, each set must be explicitly evaluated before the
check can be performed, taking some ten minutes or so on a Pentium 100Mhz3.
However, when completed, the renement checks reveal that
 the initiator still achieves correct authentication
 the responder is also authenticated without diculty
 the two nonces used in the protocol run are indeed kept out of the hands
of the intruder
In other words, the protocol is still secure even when Innocence is able to mount
the attack against low-exponent public key RSA cryptography. It would appear
that Innocence has been defeated once and for all; that Albumen and Bastien
3For more details of the time taken to perform the checks, see the appendices, where the
code is given in full.
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can run the protocol to authenticate each other, and then continue onto their
communications session using the two nonces, now guaranteed to be secret from
Innocence, free from worry. The story has a happy ending.
Chapter 4
Innocence's last stand
4.1 Setting up the communications session
How are Albumen and Bastien going to organise their communications session?
What format will their subsequent messages take, and how will they put their
secret nonces to good use?
One common method is to employ the nonces as tag nonces. A tag nonce
is a nonce known only to sender and receiver, authenticating the origin of a
message by its presence in the message. Since Albumen and Bastien are the
sole possessors of Na and Nb , any message containing one of these nonces must
have originated with either Albumen or Bastien. Although, under this method,
they will still need to use public-key cryptography to encrypt the messages,
they will avoid having to apply time-consuming public-key signatures, since the
nonces will provide the eective \signature".
Let us suppose, then, that Albumen is to use nonce Na in subsequent session
messages to Bastien, and that Bastien will incorporate Nb into his replies. So,
when Albumen wishes to send a message ma to Bastien, he will send
fma ;NagPK (B)
When Bastien wishes to respond with message mb , he will reply
fmb ;NbgPK (A)
We will now introduce the session into our model. When they have nished
running the protocol, Albumen and Bastien will enter a state controlled by a
process SESSION, determining how messages should be passed back and forth
during their communications session. This state may continue indenitely; we
wish to see if any problems arise during the communications session.
The code for the model of the system, incorporating both the strong intruder
and the communications session, is printed in full in Appendix B on page 55.
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4.1.1 Extending the data type
What messages will Albumen and Bastien be sending each other during their
session? Obviously we do not know. However, we can be sure that they will
not be content with sending other nonces for ever after! Our current data type
fact only allows such \technical" messages to be sent; and so we must add in
symbols to represent the messages that Albumen and Bastien might wish to
communicate to each other.
It is far from inconceivable that Innocence might occasionally be able to
predict a message that is sent. There are two reasons for this:
1. it is possible that Albumen and Bastien are using the protocol as only
part of a higher-level protocol; and the next message sent might be a
\handshake" message, or simple transmission of a known datum to conrm
that the session messages are being correctly received and understood
2. sometimes a message might be one from a small set of possible values, for
example fyes; nog
Neither of these possible scenarios, of course, presents a problem provided that
the predictability of one message does not have implications for future messages.
But because of the likelihood of this occurring, we should build into the model
the possibility that a guessable message is sent.
Therefore, we extend the data type with two more atomic facts, one repre-
senting a guessable message, and one representing a non-guessable message:
datatype fact = Sq. Seq(fact) |
Encrypt. (fact, fact) |
Albumen | Bastien | Innocence |
pka | pkb | pki |
ska | skb | ski |
Na | Nb | Ni |
guessme | noguess
We will later need a set of possible session message components, and so we
further dene
GuessSessMess={ guessme }
OtherSessMess={ noguess }
SessMess=union(GuessSessMess,OtherSessMess)
4.1.2 Adding more messages
We have dened a set message which contains all possible messages that might
be transmitted. This clearly needs updating with the new session messages, in
their encrypted forms, together with a nonce:
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sessionmessage = {encrypt(pk,Sq.<x,n>) |
pk<-key, n<-nonce, x<-SessMess}
message = Union({msg1,msg2,msg3,sessionmessage})
4.1.3 Changing the initiator and responder
The initiator and responder, instead of attempting to ag secrets, will now go
into a session at the end of the protocol run. Thus the denition of INITIATORx
nishes
...
initdone.a.b ->
SESSION(a,b,na,nb))
with SESSION still to be dened.
The denition of RESPONDERx is changed in a similar way.
When in a session, a user can
 signal that his nonce is still to be regarded as private
 send a guessable message
 send a non-guessable message
 receive a guessable message
 receive a non-guessable message
The SESSION process is therefore
SESSION(p,q,nc,nd) = secret.p.q.nc -> SESSION(p,q,nc,nd)
[] ([]x:SessMess @
comm.p.q.Encrypt.(pk(q),Sq.<x,nc>) ->
SESSION(p,q,nc,nd))
[] ([]x:SessMess @
comm.q.p.Encrypt.(pk(p),Sq.<x,nd>) ->
SESSION(p,q,nc,nd))
In previous versions, the secret channel was always used with the rst datum
being the initiator and the second being the responder. Note that this has
changed|either user may ag a secret, and the identity of the one who does so
is put rst.
It might be asked why the choice of message to be sent should be modelled
as deterministic rather than nondeterministic, since we cannot expect anyone
except Albumen herself to control what messages she sends, and similarly for
Bastien. Although it is quite true that the nondeterministic choice operator
would be more natural here, the reader should recall that we are operating en-
tirely within the traces model, where the two operators 2 (deterministic choice)
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and u (nondeterministic choice) are exactly equivalent. In addition, the former
is less complex and processed more quickly by FDR. We therefore prefer the
deterministic choice operator in order to speed up the computations.
4.1.4 Modifying the intruder
One slight change needs to be made to the model of the intruder. If guessme is
to be treated as a predictable message, then we can model this by stating that
the intruder knows the fact guessme from the start|that is, include guessme
in the set of atomic facts which the intruder starts with.
knownatoms = Union({user,key,{ski,Ni,guessme}})
4.2 Checking the system
The renement checks are the same as before, except that we recall that the
channel secret may now take its two user arguments in either order. We
therefore specify that secrets should not be leaked by means of
assert STOP [T= SYSTEM \ diff(Sigma, {|secret.Albumen.Bastien,
secret.Bastien.Albumen|})
4.2.1 Running the renement checks
When FDR checks for renement in the three assertions in the le, it nds that
 the initiator is still correctly authenticated
 the responder is also authenticated without incident
 a nonce has leaked to Innocence!
We should not be surprised that the authentication still holds. This question
is dealt with before the communications session is ever reached, and we have
not changed any code except to introduce the session. Albumen and Bastien
complete their protocol run with no authentication failure and no security leaks.
How, then, has Innocence discovered a nonce? FDR gives the following trace:
protocol.Albumen.Bastien
initgo.Albumen.Bastien
comm.Albumen.Bastien.Encrypt.(pkb,Sq.<Albumen,Na>)
respgo.Albumen.Bastien
comm.Bastien.Albumen.Encrypt.(pka,Sq.<Bastien,Na,Nb>)
comm.Albumen.Bastien.Encrypt.(pkb,Nb)
initdone.Albumen.Bastien
take.Albumen.Bastien.Encrypt.(pkb,Sq.<guessme,Na>)
secret.Albumen.Bastien.Na
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The rst seven events are simply an unhindered run of the protocol, with
no intruder action other than overhearing the messages. The astute reader
will notice the absence of respdone.Albumen.Bastien|this is not an error.
Albumen has sent a rst session message, and the nonce has been leaked, before
Bastien gets round to reporting that he has nished the protocol! This explains
the take in the penultimate line; a comm is not possible here, since Bastien
would have to engage in respdone.Albumen.Bastien before accepting the rst
session message. A useful result of FDR's breadth-rst search algorithm is that
it will always nd a shortest trace leading to error; and it here chooses take
over respdone and comm since the latter would increase the length of the trace
by one line.
As soon as Albumen sends the rst session message, Innocence is able to
work out the value of Na . How? Observe that Innocence has now seen
fAlbumen;NagPK (B)
and
fguessme;NagPK (B)
He knows Albumen, and he knows guessme; the RSA attack enables him to
deduce Na .
It would have made little dierence if the rst guessable message had come
from Bastien. Innocence has already seen
fNbgPK (A)
and as soon as Bastien sends
fguessme;NbgPK (A)
he can deduce the value of Nb . And, of course, the intruder can wait as long as
is necessary before a guessable message is sent; it need not be the rst message.
The fact remains that, as soon as the rst guessable message is on its way, the
system is insecure.
4.3 Implications
Innocence can still not understand the messages sent between Albumen and
Bastien|for that, he would require their secret keys. However, he possesses
their public keys, and now has a nonce with which he can sign his own messages.
When he learns Na , he can send messages purporting to be from Albumen;
anything Albumen can generate, so can Innocence. Similarly, as soon as he
discovers Nb , he can fake messages from Bastien to Albumen.
This is clearly not as serious a problem as the attack on the original version
of the protocol. Innocence successfully impersonated another agent in that in-
stance, and was put in a position of being able to send and receive messages
without arousing suspicion|Bastien committed himself to a session with Inno-
cence believing that he was talking to Albumen. Here, Innocence can only send
fake messages, and has no way of reading messages not intended for him.
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However, on any view, this is still a major breach of security. The point
of running the protocol was to provide a way of authenticating the session
messages; and the messages are no longer guaranteed to be authentic. Seemingly
out of nowhere, Innocence has invaded the system.
In the nal chapter, we will discuss how this situation has arisen, and look
at ways to prevent such security problems.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 Conclusions for protocol design
The lesson to be learnt from the attack on the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key
Protocol is clear. It is all to easy to design a protocol which looks secure; for
which no obvious method of attack presents itself; and even for which it is
possible to provide a very convincing argument for correctness; but which still
fails to achieve what it set out to do.
Martn Abadi and Roger Needham set out in [11] eleven principles of protocol
design. These principles by no means guarantee that a protocol which adheres
to them will be secure; but many protocol failures could have been avoided by
heeding these guidelines.
Above all, we are convinced that no protocol should be proposed as secure
until it has been submitted to analysis of the kind used in this dissertation.
The techniques presented are readily applied to other protocols; indeed, many
protocols have been analysed by modelling in CSP, and in the majority of cases
attacks have been found. If this work were done before presenting a supposedly
secure protocol to the unsuspecting public, much time, money and eort could
be saved, and perhaps much embarrassment avoided.
Protocol designers should be aware of the attack on low-exponent RSA,
and of its implications for their work. Since a protocol can usually make no
assumptions about the encryption algorithms used, the worst case|that the
attack is feasible|should be considered, and allowed for. This dissertation has
demonstrated how the attack may be coded into the CSP model of a protocol,
and the protocol analysed for susceptibility to such an attack; we suggest that
this should form a vital part of protocol analysis and design.
It will be readily admitted that it is a time-consuming and dicult task to
model a protocol in CSP, and that it is easy to make mistakes in the coding.
For this reason, the author has no hesitation in recommending Gavin Lowe's
Casper, a versatile and powerful protocol compiler whose input is very close to
the standard notation for protocols, and whose output is a CSP le ready to be
run under FDR. For more information on Casper, see [12].
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5.2 Conclusions for use of low-exponent RSA
In view of the attack discussed in this dissertation, we cannot recommend the
bold and uninching use of low-exponent RSA which seems to be in vogue today.
If it proves absolutely necessary to use a low exponent|and we nd it hard to
believe that it could be so|then much care needs to be taken in ensuring that
similar messages are not being transmitted under the same public key.
This must especially be borne in mind when security protocols are being
used. Protocol messages tend to be short, and it is therefore quite plausible
that two similar messages might appear encrypted under the same key. If the
exact format of the protocol being used is unknown (because it is, for example,
hidden behind an opaque user interface) then risks should not be taken.
5.3 Conclusions for protocol use
The security problem uncovered in the previous chapter was not the result of a
weak protocol. The protocol was tested in that chapter, and found to be secure
in all ways.
Nor was it the result of the use of low-exponent RSA per se. The session
messages would have been secure if the protocol messages had not been over-
heard.
The problem sprang from a subtle interaction amongst the protocol, the
cryptographic function, and the format of the session messages. This can often
be the case: that the components of the system are all secure as individual
units, but t together badly leaving gaps for an intruder to worm his way in.
It will be seen that one cannot aord to be blase in the use of a security
protocol. The surrounding structure must be as secure as the protocol itself,
or, as was the case here, a loophole might be discovered without the need to
\crack" the protocol; one weak link and the chain will break. Observe that the
problem here could have been circumvented by using a larger public key, or,
better, using private-key cryptography for the session messages (with a nonce,
or some combination of the two nonces as the key). With almost every instance
of a security loophole, one nds that it could have been very easily avoided if
only the system administrator had taken a little more care.
5.4 Summary
In this dissertation, we have
 shown how to incorporate the attack on low-exponent RSA into a CSP
model of an intruder
 used it to show that a particular protocol is secure
 demonstrated, however, that careless use of the protocol still results in
victory for the intruder
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It is our hope that this method will become a standard part of protocol analysis
using CSP. We believe that inclusion of the attack is vital if protocol analysis
is to remain rigorous and eective.
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Appendix A
CSP code for the original
protocol
This appendix gives the CSP code to model the original (awed) Needham-
Schroeder Public-Key Protocol, following the outline sketched in Chapter 2 on
page 16. As described there, it contains code for an initiator, a responder, and
the intruder.
When a Pentium 100MHz was used to check these renement assertions, it
was discovered that it took around thirty seconds to complete the rst, a further
sixteen to complete the second, and another sixteen to nish the third.
datatype fact = Sq. Seq(fact) |
Encrypt. (fact, fact) |
Albumen | Bastien | Innocence |
pka | pkb | pki |
ska | skb | ski |
Na | Nb | Ni
user = {Albumen, Bastien, Innocence}
nonce = {Na, Nb, Ni}
key = {pka, pkb, pki}
atom = nonce
pk(Albumen)=pka
pk(Bastien)=pkb
pk(Innocence)=pki
inverses={(pka,ska), (pkb,skb), (pki,ski)}
inverse(x)=elt(union({k | (z,k) <- inverses, z==x},
{k | (k,z) <- inverses, z==x}))
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elt({x}) = x
encrypt(k,m) = Encrypt. (k,m)
channel protocol:user.user
channel secret:user.user.atom
channel comm,take,fake:user.user.message
channel initgo,respgo,initdone,respdone:user.user
msg1 = {encrypt(pk,Sq.<z,n>) | pk<-key, z<-user, n<-nonce}
msg2 = {encrypt(pk,Sq.<na,nb>) |
pk<-key, na<-nonce, nb<-nonce}
msg3 = {encrypt(pk,n) | pk<-key, n<-nonce}
message = Union({msg1,msg2,msg3})
allcomm = {a.b.m | m<-message, a<-user, b<-user, a!=b}
INITIATORx(a,na) = protocol.a?b -> initgo.a.b ->
comm.a.b.encrypt(pk(b),Sq.<a,na>) ->
([] nb:nonce @
comm.b.a.encrypt(pk(a),Sq.<na,nb>) ->
comm.a.b.encrypt(pk(b),nb) ->
initdone.a.b ->
(secret.a.b.na -> STOP
[] secret.a.b.nb -> STOP))
RESPONDERx(b,nb) = ([] na:nonce @
[] a:user @
comm.a.b.encrypt(pk(b),Sq.<a,na>) ->
respgo.a.b ->
comm.b.a.encrypt(pk(a),Sq.<na,nb>) ->
comm.a.b.encrypt(pk(b),nb) ->
respdone.a.b ->
(secret.a.b.na -> STOP
[] secret.a.b.nb -> STOP))
INITIATOR(a,na) = INITIATORx(a,na)
[[comm.a <- comm.a, comm.a <- take.a]]
[[comm.b.a <- comm.b.a, comm.b.a <- fake.b.a | b <- user]]
RESPONDER(b,nb) = RESPONDERx(b,nb)
[[comm.b <- comm.b, comm.b <- take.b]]
[[comm.a.b <- comm.a.b, comm.a.b <- fake.a.b | a <- user]]
SYSTEMx = INITIATOR(Albumen,Na)
[|{|comm|}|]
RESPONDER(Bastien,Nb)
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getelt(0,xs) = head(xs)
getelt(n,xs) = getelt(n-1,tail(xs))
deduceelt(A) = {({Sq.m}, getelt(i,m)) | Sq.m<-A, i<-{0..#m-1}}
deduceseq(A) = {({getelt(i,m) | i<-{0..#m-1}}, Sq.m) | Sq.m<-A}
deduceenc(A) = {({m,pk}, Encrypt.(pk,m)) | Encrypt.(pk,m)<-A}
deducedec(A) = {({Encrypt.(pk,m),inverse(pk)}, m) |
Encrypt.(pk,m)<-A}
deductions(A) = Union({deduceelt(A),deduceseq(A),
deduceenc(A),deducedec(A)})
components(Sq.m) = union({Sq.m}, {components(x) | x<-set(m)})
components(Encrypt.(pk,m)) = union({encrypt(pk,m),pk},
components(m))
components(x) = {x}
facts = Union({components(x) | x<-message})
alldeductions = deductions(facts)
closure(A) = let Z = {f | (X,f)<-alldeductions, diff(X,A)=={}}
within
if diff(Z,A)=={} then A else closure(union(Z,A))
known = closure(Union({user,key,{ski,Ni}}))
canknow = closure(union(message,known))
canlearn = diff(canknow,known)
usefulddct = {(A,f) | (A,f)<-alldeductions,
member(f,canlearn),
diff(A,canknow)=={},
not member(f,A)}
channel say,hear:message
channel deduce:usefulddct
know(f) = member(f,message) &
(say.f -> know(f) [] hear.f -> know(f)) []
([]x:{(A,z) | (A,z)<-usefulddct, member(f,A)} @
deduce.x -> know(f)) []
member(f,atom) & secret?a?b.f -> know(f)
dontknow(f) = member(f,message) & hear.f -> know(f) []
([]x:{(A,z) | (A,z)<-usefulddct, f==z} @
deduce.x -> know(f))
sayhearknown = []x:inter(known,message) @
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(say.x -> sayhearknown
[] hear.x -> sayhearknown
[] member(x,atom) &
secret?a?b.x -> sayhearknown)
alphabet(f) = Union({
{deduce.(A,x) | (A,x)<-usefulddct,f==x},
{deduce.(A,x) | (A,x)<-usefulddct,member(f,A)},
if member(f,message) then {say.f, hear.f} else {},
if member(f,atom) then
{secret.a.b.f | a<-user, b<-user} else {}
})
transparent chase
INTRUDERx = chase((|| f:canlearn @ [alphabet(f)]
dontknow(f))\{|deduce|})
||| sayhearknown
INTRUDER = INTRUDERx
[[say <- say, say <- hear]]
[[hear.f <- comm.a.b.f,
hear.f <- take.a.b.f | a.b.f <- allcomm]]
[[say.f <- fake.a.b.f | a.b.f <- allcomm]]
RUN(A) = []x:A @ x -> RUN(A)
Sigma = {|comm,take,fake,initgo,respgo,
initdone,respdone,protocol,secret|}
auth_init_alph = {|initgo.Albumen.Bastien,
respdone.Albumen.Bastien|}
auth_initx = initgo.Albumen.Bastien ->
respdone.Albumen.Bastien -> auth_initx
auth_init = auth_initx ||| RUN(diff(Sigma,auth_init_alph))
auth_resp_alph = {|respgo.Albumen.Bastien,
initdone.Albumen.Bastien|}
auth_respx = respgo.Albumen.Bastien ->
initdone.Albumen.Bastien -> auth_respx
auth_resp = auth_respx ||| RUN(diff(Sigma,auth_resp_alph))
SYSTEM = SYSTEMx [|{|comm,take,fake,secret|}|] INTRUDER
assert auth_init [T= SYSTEM
assert auth_resp [T= SYSTEM
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assert STOP [T= SYSTEM \ diff(Sigma, {|secret.Albumen.Bastien|})
Appendix B
CSP code for the strong
intruder
Following is the CSP code for modelling the xed version of the Needham-
Schroeder Public-Key Protocol, as given in Section 2.5 on page 29, with a
demonstration of how an intruder who knows the attack on low-exponent RSA
cryptography (see Section 3.2 on page 33) might still break the security of a
system, if sucient care is not given to the use of cryptography in the commu-
nications session following the protocol run.
Running these renement checks on a Pentium 100MHz revealed that, no
matter what order the checks were run in, the rst check to be run took approx-
imately eleven and a half minutes; the second and the third took approximately
three minutes each. It would appear that about eight and a half minutes of the
time spent on the rst check is spent on enumerating sets which can be used in
all three checks.
datatype fact = Sq. Seq(fact) |
Encrypt. (fact, fact) |
Albumen | Bastien | Innocence |
pka | pkb | pki |
ska | skb | ski |
Na | Nb | Ni |
guessme | noguess
user = {Albumen, Bastien, Innocence}
nonce = {Na, Nb, Ni}
key = {pka, pkb, pki}
atom = nonce
pk(Albumen)=pka
pk(Bastien)=pkb
pk(Innocence)=pki
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inverses={(pka,ska), (pkb,skb), (pki,ski)}
inverse(x)=elt(union({k | (z,k) <- inverses, z==x},
{k | (k,z) <- inverses, z==x}))
elt({x}) = x
encrypt(k,m) = Encrypt. (k,m)
channel protocol:user.user
channel secret:user.user.atom
channel comm,take,fake:user.user.message
channel initgo,respgo,initdone,respdone:user.user
msg1 = {encrypt(pk,Sq.<z,n>) | pk<-key, z<-user, n<-nonce}
msg2 = {encrypt(pk,Sq.<z,na,nb>) |
z<-user, pk<-key, na<-nonce, nb<-nonce}
msg3 = {encrypt(pk,n) | pk<-key, n<-nonce}
GuessSessMess={ guessme }
OtherSessMess={ noguess }
SessMess=union(GuessSessMess,OtherSessMess)
sessionmessage = {encrypt(pk,Sq.<x,n>) |
pk<-key, n<-nonce, x<-SessMess}
message = Union({msg1,msg2,msg3,sessionmessage})
allcomm = {a.b.m | m<-message, a<-user, b<-user, a!=b}
INITIATORx(a,na) = protocol.a?b -> initgo.a.b ->
comm.a.b.encrypt(pk(b),Sq.<a,na>) ->
([] nb:nonce @
comm.b.a.encrypt(pk(a),Sq.<b,na,nb>) ->
comm.a.b.encrypt(pk(b),nb) ->
initdone.a.b ->
SESSION(a,b,na,nb))
RESPONDERx(b,nb) = ([] na:nonce @
[] a:user @
comm.a.b.encrypt(pk(b),Sq.<a,na>) ->
respgo.a.b ->
comm.b.a.encrypt(pk(a),Sq.<b,na,nb>) ->
comm.a.b.encrypt(pk(b),nb) ->
respdone.a.b ->
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SESSION(b,a,nb,na))
INITIATOR(a,na) = INITIATORx(a,na)
[[comm.a <- comm.a, comm.a <- take.a]]
[[comm.b.a <- comm.b.a, comm.b.a <- fake.b.a | b <- user]]
RESPONDER(b,nb) = RESPONDERx(b,nb)
[[comm.b <- comm.b, comm.b <- take.b]]
[[comm.a.b <- comm.a.b, comm.a.b <- fake.a.b | a <- user]]
SESSION(p,q,nc,nd) = secret.p.q.nc -> SESSION(p,q,nc,nd)
[] ([]x:SessMess @
comm.p.q.Encrypt.(pk(q),Sq.<x,nc>) ->
SESSION(p,q,nc,nd))
[] ([]x:SessMess @
comm.q.p.Encrypt.(pk(p),Sq.<x,nd>) ->
SESSION(p,q,nc,nd))
SYSTEMx = INITIATOR(Albumen,Na)
[|{|comm|}|]
RESPONDER(Bastien,Nb)
getelt(0,xs) = head(xs)
getelt(n,xs) = getelt(n-1,tail(xs))
deduceelt(A) = {({Sq.m}, getelt(i,m)) | Sq.m<-A, i<-{0..#m-1}}
deduceseq(A) = {({getelt(i,m) | i<-{0..#m-1}}, Sq.m) | Sq.m<-A}
deduceenc(A) = {({m,pk}, Encrypt.(pk,m)) | Encrypt.(pk,m)<-A}
deducedec(A) = {({Encrypt.(pk,m),inverse(pk)}, m) |
Encrypt.(pk,m)<-A}
pkencs(A,pk) = {m | Encrypt.(pk,Sq.m)<-A}
cantdec = {k | k<-key, not member(inverse(k),knownatoms)}
inits(<x>) = { (<x>,{}) }
inits(<x>^xs) = union({ (<x>,set(xs)) },
{ (<x>^y,R) | (y,R)<-inits(xs) })
joinup(Z,J) = { (s,union(R,J)) | (s,R)<-Z }
subseq(<>) = {}
subseq(<x>^xs) = union(joinup(subseq(xs),{x}), inits(<x>^xs))
justsubseq(m) = { s | (s,R)<-subseq(m) }
commonsubseq(m,n) = { (s,union(R,B)) | (s,R)<-subseq(m),
(t,B)<-subseq(n),
s==t }
maxcommonsubseq(m,n) = let Q = commonsubseq(m,n)
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within
{ (s,R) | (s,R)<-Q,
{ t | (t,B)<-Q,
member(s,justsubseq(t)) }=={s}}
deducersa(A) = {(Union({{Encrypt.(pk,Sq.m), Encrypt.(pk,Sq.n)},
R
}),x) |
pk<-cantdec,
m<-pkencs(A,pk), n<-pkencs(A,pk),
m!=n,
(s,R)<-maxcommonsubseq(m,n),
x<-set(s)}
deduc2rsa(A) = {(Union({{Encrypt.(pk,Sq.m), Encrypt.(pk,n)},
diff(set(m),{n})
}),n) |
pk<-cantdec,
m<-pkencs(A,pk),
n<-set(m)}
deductions(A) = Union({deduceelt(A),deduceseq(A),
deduceenc(A),deducedec(A),
deducersa(A),deduc2rsa(A)})
components(Sq.m) = union({Sq.m}, {components(x) | x<-set(m)})
components(Encrypt.(pk,m)) =
union({encrypt(pk,m),pk},components(m))
components(x) = {x}
facts = Union({components(x) | x<-message})
alldeductions = deductions(facts)
closure(A) = let Z = {f | (X,f)<-alldeductions, diff(X,A)=={}}
within
if diff(Z,A)=={} then A else closure(union(Z,A))
knownatoms = Union({user,key,{ski,Ni,guessme}})
known = closure(knownatoms)
canknow = closure(union(message,known))
canlearn = diff(canknow,known)
usefulddct = {(A,f) | (A,f)<-alldeductions,
member(f,canlearn),
diff(A,canknow)=={},
not member(f,A)}
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channel say,hear:message
channel deduce:usefulddct
know(f) = member(f,message) &
(say.f -> know(f) [] hear.f -> know(f)) []
([]x:{(A,z) | (A,z)<-usefulddct, member(f,A)} @
deduce.x -> know(f)) []
member(f,atom) & secret?a?b.f -> know(f)
dontknow(f) = member(f,message) & hear.f -> know(f) []
([]x:{(A,z) | (A,z)<-usefulddct, f==z} @
deduce.x -> know(f))
sayhearknown = []x:inter(known,message) @
(say.x -> sayhearknown
[] hear.x -> sayhearknown
[] member(x,atom) &
secret?a?b.x -> sayhearknown)
alphabet(f) = Union({
{deduce.(A,x) | (A,x)<-usefulddct,f==x},
{deduce.(A,x) | (A,x)<-usefulddct,member(f,A)},
if member(f,message) then {say.f, hear.f} else {},
if member(f,atom) then
{secret.a.b.f | a<-user, b<-user} else {}
})
transparent chase
INTRUDERx = chase((|| f:canlearn @ [alphabet(f)]
dontknow(f))\{|deduce|})
||| sayhearknown
INTRUDER = INTRUDERx
[[say <- say, say <- hear]]
[[hear.f <- comm.a.b.f,
hear.f <- take.a.b.f | a.b.f<-allcomm]]
[[say.f <- fake.a.b.f | a.b.f<-allcomm]]
RUN(A) = []x:A @ x -> RUN(A)
Sigma = {|comm,take,fake,initgo,respgo,
initdone,respdone,protocol,secret|}
auth_init_alph = {|initgo.Albumen.Bastien,
respdone.Albumen.Bastien|}
auth_initx = initgo.Albumen.Bastien ->
respdone.Albumen.Bastien ->
auth_initx
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auth_init = auth_initx ||| RUN(diff(Sigma,auth_init_alph))
auth_resp_alph = {|respgo.Albumen.Bastien,
initdone.Albumen.Bastien|}
auth_respx = respgo.Albumen.Bastien ->
initdone.Albumen.Bastien ->
auth_respx
auth_resp = auth_respx ||| RUN(diff(Sigma,auth_resp_alph))
SYSTEM = SYSTEMx [|{|comm,take,fake,secret|}|] INTRUDER
assert auth_init [T= SYSTEM
assert auth_resp [T= SYSTEM
assert STOP [T= SYSTEM \ diff(Sigma, {|secret.Albumen.Bastien,
secret.Bastien.Albumen|})
